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Abstract 
Prior research has shown that activated concepts may influence subsequent interpretation 
and judgmental processes via priming. Building on this evidence, we suggest that the fluency 
associated with concept activation may determine whether activated content elicits 
assimilation or contrast. In two experiments, concept activation in a typical priming 
experiment was rendered fluent or non-fluent. Consistent with hypotheses, fluent concept 
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The fate of activated information in impression formation: Fluency of concept activation 
moderates the emergence of assimilation versus contrast  
In their pioneering work on concept priming, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) 
reported that a target person named Donald was evaluated more or less positively 
depending on whether participants had unobtrusively been exposed to trait adjectives 
signifying persistence or recklessness. Presumably, this was because the ambiguously 
described Donald (who had, e.g., taken part in a demolition derby) was perceived in line with 
the activated trait concept, which in turn led to an according assimilation of evaluations (see 
also Srull & Wyer, 1979). Since then, the concept of priming generated tremendous amounts 
of research and gained support not only in impression formation tasks (e.g., Sedikides, 1990; 
for overviews, see Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989), but also in other domains such as 
behavior (e.g., Smeesters, Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Warlop, 2009). Much to our surprise, 
however, priming has rarely been linked to another very prominent concept in social-
cognitive research: the fluency of cognitive processing (e.g., Schwarz, 1998, 2004). 
Addressing this gap, we propose that the fluency of concept activation may moderate 
whether subsequent judgments are assimilated to or contrasted against this activated 
concept. What follows is to substantiate this hypothesis by briefly reviewing the relevant 
literature on concept priming (for other effects of priming, see, e.g., Förster & Liberman, 
2007). 
Concept priming 
The initial findings by Higgins and colleagues (1977) as well as Srull and Wyer (1979) 
revealed that the activation of a trait concept results in assimilation, in that judgments reflect 
the implications of the activated primes. However, this occurred only when the primes were 
applicable to Donald’s behavior (e.g., persistent) but not when the primes were non-
applicable (e.g., obedient).  
Subsequent research showed that accessible and applicable primes do not 
necessarily lead to assimilation, but may also result in contrast, in that judgments reflect the 
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opposite of the activated primes. Such contrast effects are likely to occur, for instance, when 
individuals become aware of the primed information (e.g., Martin, 1986; Strack, Schwarz, 
Bless, Kübler, & Wänke, 1993), or when the primes are extreme rather than moderate (Herr, 
Sherman, & Fazio, 1983).   
To account for the emergence of assimilation and contrast effects, different 
explanations have been proposed (e.g., Martin, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1992). Many of these focus on how the activated content is used. On the one hand, 
the activated content can be perceived as representative and relevant for the target and 
hence used to construct an according mental representation (Schwarz & Bless, 1992) or 
interpretation frame (Stapel, 2007), resulting in assimilation. Alternatively, individuals may 
perceive the activated content as not representative or relevant for constructing the target 
representation, and may therefore use this information to construct a standard of comparison 
(Schwarz & Bless, 1992) or comparison frame (Stapel, 2007), resulting in contrast.  
Higgins (1996) summarized representativeness and relevance within the notion of 
judged usability, which holds that accessible and applicable content information produces 
assimilation effects when perceived as appropriate for target evaluation. He emphasized that 
judged usability goes beyond accessibility and applicability, and crucially determines the fate 
of primed information. In what follows we argue that judged usability may be affected by the 
fluency with which information is activated.  
Fluency  
Fluency refers to the ease with which cognitive processes can be executed. It may 
take various forms, including encoding fluency (Koriat & Ma'ayan, 2005), retrieval fluency 
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991; Weick & Guinote, 2008), or perceptual fluency (e.g., Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999). The impact of fluency on judgments and decisions is generally 
conceptualized as a feelings-as-information-process (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This 
influence is not rare, but ubiquitous and strong (e.g., Schwarz, Song, & Xu, 2008), 
supposedly because fluency engenders from continuous monitoring of cognitive processing 
and is therefore constantly available (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2000).  
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Going beyond existing research, we propose that fluency may provide information 
about the usability of activated concepts. Specifically, we hypothesize that fluent activation 
serves as a “use-tag,” whereas non-fluent activation serves as a “non-use-tag” with respect 
to the default use of an accessible and applicable concept when constructing the 
representation of the target. When activation is fluent, the concept may be perceived as 
usable and is included in the representation of the target, resulting in assimilation. When 
concept activation is non-fluent, the concept may be perceived as less usable for 
constructing the target representation. Intriguingly, information deemed non-usable for target 
representation may be used to construct the standard against which the target is compared, 
thus resulting in contrast (e.g., Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Stapel, 2007).  
Several lines of research support the hypothesis that fluency signals usability. For 
instance, fluency has been identified as a signal of truth (truth effect, e.g., Hasher, Goldstein, 
& Toppino, 1977), supposedly because information multiply observed (and therefore fluent) 
has convergent validity. Similarly, fluency has been identified as a signal of confidence (e.g., 
Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Wänke, Bless, & 
Biller, 1996), presumably because well-supported information, which can be relied on 
confidently, is retrieved more fluently. Fluency has also been shown to signal importance and 
usability. For instance, Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) observed that a consumer review was 
weighted more heavily in product evaluation when it could be read fluently, seemingly 
because the fluency from reading the review influenced the use of this piece of information in 
subsequent evaluation. Finally, the proposed fluency-usability hypothesis maps onto the 
central tenets of the self-validation hypothesis (Briñol & Petty, 2009), which holds that for 
information to influence judgments, individuals must have confidence in this information. 
Among other sources, this confidence may arise from fluency (Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 
2002).  
From a process-perspective, the proposed fluency-usability account may be 
categorized as an indirect effect, as fluency determines the subsequent use of content 
information—such as when fluency influences the weight of (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007) or 
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the confidence in (Tormala et al., 2002) activated information. Shah and Oppenheimer 
(2007) differentiated such indirect effects from direct uses of fluency, for instance, when 
experiences of ease-of-retrieval themselves serve as information in judgment formation 
(Schwarz et al., 1991).  
Experiment 1 
To test the proposed fluency-usability hypothesis, a variant of the sentence 
unscrambling task introduced by Srull and Wyer (1979) was used to supraliminally activate 
concepts related to interdependence (e.g., family, team; task adapted from Kühnen & 
Hannover, 2000). Processing fluency was manipulated by rendering sentence unscrambling 
easy or difficult. In an ostensibly unrelated task, participants were exposed to the description 
of a target person Paul who showed ambivalent behaviors with respect to interdependence. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Seventy-three University of Mannheim students (all male to match the gender of the 
target person) participated in return for 2 EUR and a chocolate bar (about 3.00 USD). 
Participants (mean age 23.36 years, SD = 3.31) were randomly assigned to a low fluency, 
high fluency, or control condition. Two participants were excluded from analyses as they did 
not comply with the necessary order of “unrelated experiments.“ 
Procedures and materials 
Concept priming. Participants worked on 27 six-word combinations in the context of a 
sentence unscrambling task labeled language comprehension test. Twenty-three word 
combinations pertained to the concept of interdependence; four were unrelated fillers. For 
each word combination, participants were instructed to find the one word that did not fit into a 
meaningful 5-word-sentence and to write it on a line alongside the scrambled words. There 
was only one possible solution for each word combination. By focusing on non-fitting words 
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(only some of which were related to the primed concept), participants’ attention was directed 
away from the coherent sentence primes, thus minimizing concept awareness. Participants 
in the control condition did not work on this task.  
Processing fluency. We hypothesized that the non-fitting word can be identified more 
fluently the more the five fitting words are presented in correct grammatical order. 
Accordingly, to establish different levels of processing fluency, we manipulated the order in 
which the six words were presented by following (high fluency) or violating (low fluency) 
grammatical rules.1 Independent pre-testing revealed that solving the high-fluency set (e.g., I 
feel other people with classify) was perceived as more fluent than solving the low-fluent set 
(e.g., with feel other I classify people; four items, Cronbach’s  = .88; M = 8.13, SD = 0.66, 
M = 5.08, SD = 1.51, respectively; t(5) = 3.68, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 2.61). We expected that 
this manipulation creates differential levels of processing fluency that are, if anything, 
negatively correlated to the primed concept’s accessibility (see General Discussion).  
Impression formation task. Directly afterwards, in a presumably unrelated experiment, 
participants read a story about Paul, an old friend from school the narrator had not been in 
contact since then. Paul is described ambiguously with respect to his interdependence, 
including statements that indicate independence (e.g., “Paul lives on his own“), statements 
that indicate interdependence (e.g., “Paul has served on a student committee“), and 
unrelated statements (e.g., “Paul has recently started jogging“). Care was taken that the 
interdependent statements were different from those in the priming procedure.  
Dependent measures. Participants evaluated Paul on a series of eight statements 
that were created based on standard assessment tools of primarily interdependent self-
construal (e.g., Singelis, 1994). The first four items were presented on 9-point-scales (from 1 
to 9, with varying labels), and read, for example, “When making an important decision, how 
likely is it that Paul bears the interests of others in mind?“ (1, not at all likely, to 9, very likely). 
The last four items were presented on 11-point-scales (from 0, does not apply, to 10, strongly 
applies), and read, for example, “Paul strongly values harmony.“ 
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Finally, participants were probed for the cover story of unrelated experiments. None 
of the participants reported a connection between the two ostensibly unrelated experiments.  
Results and Discussion 
The eight evaluative items were rescaled such that higher values indicate more 
interdependence, were individually z-transformed, and were averaged (Cronbach’s α = .69). 
Planned contrast analysis revealed that Paul was evaluated as significantly more 
interdependent in the condition of high as compared to low fluency (M = .18, SD = .66, M = -
.18, SD = .48, respectively; t(69) = 2.35, p < .03, Cohen’s d = 0.63), with the control group 
falling in between (M = .00, SD = .47; overall-ANOVA, F(2, 69) = 2.76, p < .072, ² = .07). 
This pattern of results supports the assumption that individuals use the activated content to 
interpret the target when concept activation is fluent, presumably because fluency signals 
usability with respect to the default use in representing the target. When concept activation is 
non-fluent, however, it appears that the activated content is not used for constructing the 
target representation, but to construct a standard against which the target is compared, thus 
resulting in contrast.    
Experiment 2 
Two important changes were introduced in Experiment 2: First, the unrelated-
experiment story was strengthened by conducting the priming task computer-based, whereas 
the ostensible second experiment was assessed paper-and-pencil. Second, only half of the 
participants were primed with interdependence (Experiment 1), whereas the other 
participants were primed with independence. To the extent that the proposed fluency-
usability hypothesis is viable, a reversal of the findings reported for primed interdependence 
is expected for primed independence, namely that Paul is evaluated as more interdependent 
the less fluently the concept of independence was activated. Importantly, such an interaction 
finding would refute alternative explanations, such as that indicating the non-matching word 
would focus participants on relationships between words and thus would procedurally prime 
the concept of interdependence (see Kühnen & Hannover, 2000). If this was true, the same 
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pattern of results would be expected for priming the concepts of interdependence versus 
independence, because the task of indicating the non-matching word remains constant.  
Method 
Participants and design 
Sixty male University of Mannheim students participated in return for 1 EUR and a 
chocolate bar (about 1.80 USD). Participants (mean age: 22.86 years, SD = 3.94) were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (priming: interdependence vs. independence) x 2 (fluency: low vs. 
high) factorial design. 
Procedures and materials 
Processing fluency. Except for minor changes in word order, the interdependence 
primes were identical to those in Experiment 1. For the independence primes, again a high 
fluency and a low fluency version was constructed by adhering to or violating grammatical 
rules. One high-fluency prime read “I really love being works independent,“ whereas the low-
fluency prime read “independent works I really being love.“ Independent pre-testing revealed 
that solving the high-fluency as compared to low-fluency set was not only perceived as more 
fluent (four items, Cronbach’s  = .92; M = 7.32, SD = 1.03, M = 5.76, SD = 1.63, 
respectively; F(1, 43) = 14.58, p < .01, ² = .25; all other Fs < 1.2), but could also be solved 
more quickly (average latency per item in seconds; M = 8.46, SD = 1.78, M = 9.87, 
SD = 2.98, respectively; F(1, 43) = 3.65, p < .065, ² = .08; all other Fs < 1).  
Dependent measures. The items from Experiment 1 were refined, yielding a new set 
of six items such as “Paul is a group person,“ all assessed with 11-point-scales, ranging from 
0, does not apply, to 10, strongly applies.  
Finally, participants were probed for the cover-story of unrelated experiments. None 
of the participants reported any connection between the two ostensibly unrelated 
experiments.  
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Results and Discussion 
The six dependent variables were scaled such that higher values indicate higher 
levels of interdependence, averaged (Cronbach’s α = .75), and subjected to a 2 (priming: 
interdependence vs. independence) x 2 (fluency: low vs. high) analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
which yielded the predicted significant interaction, F(1,56) = 4.06, p < .05, ² = .07 (all other 
Fs < 1). Evaluations reflected the implications of the prime (assimilation) when concept 
activation was fluent, but presumably elicited contrast when concept activation was non-
fluent (see Figure 1). It needs to be acknowledged that the simple contrasts did not reach 
conventional levels of significance, t(56) =  1.14, p < .26, Cohen’s d = 0.41, t(56) = -1.71, 
p < .095, Cohen’s d = 0.64, for interdependence versus independence primes, respectively. 
Although this would have been desirable, it appears secondary given that a significant 
interaction and a clear disordinal pattern of results were observed. Note also that the 
conclusion that both assimilation and contrast occurred is supported in reference to the 
findings observed in Experiment 1, but remains tentative here, because no control group was 
assessed in Experiment 2.  
Taken together, the present findings replicate the results for interdependence primes 
observed in Experiment 1, and revealed an opposite pattern for independence primes. 
Finding the reverse pattern of results when priming the opposite construct attests to the 
notion that fluency may moderate the impact of activated concepts. Moreover, the observed 
interaction pattern refutes alternative explanations that would predict main effects.  
General Discussion 
In two experiments, participants evaluated a target person displaying ambiguous 
behaviors. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977), activating an applicable 
concept affected evaluations. Extending these findings, the impact on evaluations depended 
on how the concepts were activated. When concept activation was fluent, subsequent 
evaluations reflected the implications of the activated concepts. However, when concept 
activation occurred non-fluently, evaluations were influenced in a direction opposite to the 
 Fluency and priming     - 11 - 
implications of the primed concepts. This occurred presumably because fluency may serve 
as a “tag” as to the usability of activated concepts. When perceived as usable, an accessible 
and applicable concept produces assimilation. However, when deemed unusable (for the 
default of constructing the target representation), the activated concepts may instead be 
used to construct the standard of comparison, thus eliciting contrast. These conjectures are 
consistent with the notion of judged usability (Higgins, 1996). Together with prior research on 
assimilation and contrast in concept priming (e.g., DeCoster & Claypool, 2004), the present 
findings suggest that in order to understand context dependency in social judgment, it is 
essential but not sufficient to relate to the notion of accessibility, but also to how the 
accessible information is used.  
Several aspects of the present research deserve mention. First, to rule out 
accessibility-based alternative explanations for the observed pattern of results, a new fluency 
manipulation was introduced. Specifically, concept activation was rendered fluent by 
manipulating the ease or difficulty of sentence unscrambling. In contrast to other 
manipulations of fluency (such as perceptual contrast, e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999), this 
methodology is likely to set the stage such that fluency and accessibility are uncorrelated. 
This is because semantic processing may be expected to be complete only when the word 
combinations are fully unscrambled, such that prime exposure and concept accessibility are 
independent of manipulations affecting the task of unscrambling itself, like variations in word 
order. But even if concept priming occurred before the word combinations are unscrambled, 
low-fluency participants would be exposed longer (rather than shorter) to prime information, 
hence producing higher (rather than lower) concept accessibility. Accordingly, by 
manipulating the ease or difficulty of unscrambling, the stage can be set such that fluency 
and accessibility are not positively correlated, and hence discernable. While theoretically 
compelling, it is important to note that concept accessibility was not directly assessed in the 
present experiments. Alternative outcomes are thus at least theoretically conceivable, such 
as that difficult unscrambling focuses participants’ attention towards alternative semantic 
constructs that may potentially be triggered by the presented words. In contrast to the above 
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conjectures, this may reduce the accessibility of the primed concepts in the difficult 
unscrambling condition, thereby aligning fluency and accessibility.  
Second, one may argue that in the non-fluent conditions individuals have become 
more aware of the priming episode, and that it was not perceived non-fluency, but rather 
awareness that caused the contrast effects (e.g., Martin, 1986). Note however, that in both 
experiments we probed for evidence that participants saw any connection between the 
ostensibly unrelated studies, but none of the participants reported so. Moreover, by 
instructing participants to find the non-fitting words, participants’ attention was directed away 
from the coherent prime sentences. It appears likely that this proceeding prevented 
participants from spontaneously becoming aware of the primed concept. Nevertheless, it is 
not impossible that (non-)fluency increased prime awareness, especially given the fact that 
the majority of the to be unscrambled sentences was related to the prime concept. To 
overcome this limitation, future research should strive to reduce the likelihood of concept 
awareness as well as to improve its assessment. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that no direct evidence regarding the presumed 
mediation via judged usability is available.2 Of course, this opens the door for potential 
alternative mechanisms, which we briefly discuss in the remaining paragraphs.  
Fluency and positive affect. As fluency has been linked to positive affect (Winkielman 
& Cacioppo, 2001), one may hypothesize that fluently activated concepts are valued 
positively, whereas non-fluently activated concepts are valued negatively. This positivity-
negativity-tag may then determine whether information is used in impression formation. Note 
that this hypothesis has considerable conceptual overlap with our fluency-usability account, 
as it differs only in the “tagging.”  
Fluency and categorization processes. Oppenheimer and Frank (2008) reported that 
high-fluency exemplars are more likely to be perceived as members of an activated category. 
Based on this finding, one may speculate that fluency increases the likelihood for activated 
information to be perceived as pertinent to the category, and hence included in the target 
representation. Note that this explanation is different from the here advanced fluency-
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usability account, because fluency is assumed to exert its influence on the level of 
categorization processes. 
Fluency and processing strategies. Like affective feelings, cognitive feelings have 
been suggested to act as “go“ or “stop“ signals for subsequent information processing 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). One may therefore suspect that non-fluent concept activation 
increases the likelihood that individuals, when constructing the target representation, 
scrutinize the activated concepts carefully for whether they are usable. This may increase the 
likelihood of detecting undue prime influences, resulting in contrast (Martin, 1986).  
In sum, several conceptually related processes concur that the fluency of concept 
activation may moderate the use of activated concepts. Based on the present data, it cannot 
be determined which of the outlined mechanisms was underlying the observed effects, 
though the here advocated fluency-usability hypothesis appears most plausible in light of 
prior theorizing (Higgins, 1996). It is up to future research to fruitfully dissociate these 
different possibilities. Together with the present findings, such evidence is likely to further 
elucidate and highlight the important role that fluency plays in the regulation of cognitive 
processing.  
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Footnotes 
1 For illustrative purposes, the cited examples adhere to or violate English (instead of 
German) grammatical rules.  
2 It is interesting that while variants of usability (e.g., relevance, representativeness) are 
widely accepted as mediators of assimilation and contrast, evidence mostly pertains to 
manipulations of these variables rather than to their assessment. Presumably this reflects 
that individuals have little introspective access to this kind of information. 
 
 Fluency and priming     - 18 - 
Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Mean evaluation ratings of Paul with standard errors in Experiment 2 as a function 
of fluency and priming. Higher ratings indicate a more interdependent evaluation. 
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